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INTRODUCTION
Craig and Sarah are customers of Cascadia Corporation, a large online retailer.
Cascadia tracks the buying habits and personal information of its customers to
provide advertising that its customers are more likely to appreciate and to predict the
types of products and services its customers will want to purchase in the future. To
this end, Cascadia stores vast amounts of information about its customers in its
corporate data center. The company employs a large team of technology and
cybersecurity engineers, but its Board of Directors does not always see the value in
fully funding the security recommendations of the engineering teams. Vulnerabilities
abound.
One day, Craig and Sarah are notified that their personal information—including
names, credit card numbers, birthdays, physical addresses, telephone numbers, and
a list of every product Craig and Sarah have ever purchased—have been stolen by
hackers. Neither have seen any malicious activity on their accounts yet, but they
know their data has been compromised and could be sold online. They worry they
could have their identities stolen but also that their buying habits, including the more
personal ones, could be made available for the public to see.
As news leaks of Cascadia’s relaxed cybersecurity measures, Craig and Sarah
become angry that a company they trusted would put them in this position. They
consider joining together, along with other similarly situated consumers, in a class
action lawsuit to sue the company. At their first meeting with an attorney, she asks
Craig and Sarah: What’s the harm? Have you suffered any financial loss because of
this? Has anyone actually stolen your identity? Neither know how to respond. They
feel as though they have been harmed. The company’s failure to secure their private

* J.D., Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2020; M.S. in Cybersecurity Risk
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data means they must now worry about how that data will be used. But is that
enough? The attorney worries that Craig and Sarah may not even have standing to
bring suit in federal court.
Unfortunately, this story is common. The breach of corporate data networks by
malicious actors is the new normal.1 As a result, private consumer data is often
viewed or stolen, or even placed for sale online.2 The hackers who are directly
responsible for these data breaches are often never caught.3 Instead of suing these
largely unidentified hackers, the consumers affected by the breaches then sue the
businesses on a variety of causes of action for any role the business’s lack of adequate
cybersecurity measures played in the disclosure of personal information.4 Thus,
companies are often the target of large-scale data breach litigation.5
Often, this data is used in identity theft crimes.6 But regardless, the exposure of
consumer data creates a risk of malicious use, anxiety on the part of the consumer,

1. Benjamin Dynkin & Barry Dynkin, Derivative Liability in the Wake of a Cyber
Attack, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 23, 33 (2018) (“[T]here are so many data breaches that
consumers are beginning to report ‘data breach fatigue.’”).
2. While some stolen data may end up for sale on the dark web, other stolen data may
be disclosed online for all to see. See Alex Hern, Largest Collection Ever of Breached Data
Found, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2019, 12:31 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology
/2019/jan/17/breached-data-largest-collection-ever-seen-email-password-hacking
[https:/
/perma.cc/D233-E9FU]; Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, 4 Stolen Health Databases Reportedly
for Sale on Dark Web, DATA BREACH TODAY (June 27, 2016), https://www.databreachtoday
.com/3-stolen-health-databases-reportedly-for-sale-on-dark-web-a-9227 [https://perma.cc
/9QSA-4Z3D]; Kate O’Flaherty, Another 127 Million Records Have Gone on Sale on the Dark
Web – Here’s What You Should Do, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2019, 7:50 AM), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2019/02/15/another-127-million-records-have-gone-on-sale-onthe-dark-web-heres-what-you-should-do/#4348d2293044 [https://perma.cc/MRX5-BM38].
3. Roger A. Grimes, Why It’s So Hard to Prosecute Cyber Criminals, CSO (Dec. 6,
2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3147398/why-its-so-hard-to-prosecutecyber-criminals.html [https://perma.cc/NFY2-2VY8] (“Cyber criminals steal hundreds of
millions of dollars each year with near impunity. For every 1 that gets caught, 10,000 go free
– maybe more.”). Still, hackers are sometimes caught, especially if they boast about their
exploits. See Emily Flitter & Karen Weise, Capital One Data Breach Compromises Data of
Over 100 Million, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29
/business/capital-one-data-breach-hacked.html
[https://perma.cc/2HRG-DU9L]
(“The
suspect, Paige Thompson, 33, left a trail online for investigators to follow as she boasted about
the hacking, according to court documents in Seattle, where she was arrested and charged with
one count of computer fraud and abuse.”).
4. See infra Part II.
5. David Balser, Phyllis Sumner, Stewart Haskins & John Toro, INSIGHT: Data Breach
Litigation Trends to Watch, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 4, 2019, 4:01 AM), https://news
.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/insight-data-breach-litigation-trends-to-watch
[https:/
/perma.cc/CP57-SL58] (discussing the scale at which data breaches occur and that they often
lead to litigation and regulatory enforcement actions).
6. See Matt Tatham, Experian Forecasts the Top 5 Data Breach Predictions for 2019,
DATA BREACH (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/experianforecasts-the-top-5-data-breach-predictions-for-2019
[https://perma.cc/89XZ-DHNR]
(discussing the increased risk in identity theft because the increase in personal data exposure
“has made it easy for cybercriminals to monetize stolen data, which has, in turn, led to an
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and represents an invasion of the consumer’s privacy.7 In fact, Statistica noted in
2014 that Americans now worry about the harm from hacking more than most other
harms.8 Statistica notes that sixty-nine percent of respondents to a recent Gallop poll
reported being “frequently or occasionally worr[ied] about having credit card
information stolen by hackers,” while only thirty-one percent feared getting mugged
and only eighteen percent feared being murdered.9 This is probably because “over a
quarter of all Americans have experienced” credit card data theft, while few
Americans experience more violent crimes like robbery.10 Jordan Elias noted that
“the dominant harm from data breaches lies not in low-level fraud but in the loss of
private facts themselves and consequent damage of an intangible nature: anxiety,
depression, and distress.”11
Once a breach has occurred, consumers often form class action lawsuits against
the breached business.12 These lawsuits are based on a variety of causes of action,
including negligence, breach of an express or implied contract, violations of state
consumer privacy laws, and violations of state breach notification laws.13 Still, a
major hurdle for plaintiffs in these actions has been to convince the federal judiciary
that they have standing to sue, such that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction.14

increased risk of identity theft”).
7. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Liability for Data Injuries, 2019 ILL. L. REV.
295, 347 (discussing the invasion of privacy torts and noting that the malicious actor, and not
the company, invaded the consumer’s privacy); Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron,
Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 745 (2018)
(“Knowing that thieves may be using one’s personal data for criminal ends can produce
significant anxiety.”).
8. Niall McCarthy, Hacking Has Become Every American’s Worst Nightmare,
STATISTICA (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.statista.com/chart/2881/hacking-has-become-everyamericans-worst-nightmare [https://perma.cc/8RZA-S4JS].
9. Id.
10. Id.; Robbery Rate Per 100,000 Inhabitants in the United States in 2019, by State,
STATISTICA (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/232564/robbery-rate-in-the-usby-state [https://perma.cc/3AMC-YRXQ] (showing that the robbery rate in the United States
was 81.6 per 100,000).
11. Jordan Elias, Course Correction—Data Breach as Invasion of Privacy, 69 BAYLOR L.
REV. 574, 576 (2017).
12. See Solove et al., supra note 7, at 749; see also Daniel Bugni, Standing Together: An
Analysis of the Injury Requirement in Data Breach Class Actions, 52 GONZ. L. REV. 59, 62
(2017) (“Due to the large number of consumers affected, the high frequency, and the sensitive
nature of the information lost in data breaches, class actions are a crucial mechanism for
ensuring damaged consumers have access to justice and may seek relief.”).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (2018) (“To invoke
federal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show a ‘personal stake’ in the outcome of the action. . . .
A case that becomes moot at any point during the proceeding is ‘no longer a “Case” or
“Controversy” for purposes of Article III,’ and is outside the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.”); see also Bugni, supra note 12, at 63 (“Data breach class actions present a quandary
because, although the plaintiffs’ information is stolen, there is often no indication of financial
damages when plaintiffs bring suit. Due to this lack of concrete financial loss, many courts
dismiss for lack of injury.”). The difficulty of the standing hurdle likely exists because the law
does not seem to be settled here. See Solove et al., supra note 7, at 739 (“The concept of harm
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Specifically, the courts typically analyze whether plaintiffs have standing based on
an identity theft analysis.15 They ask whether the exposure of the consumers’ data
has resulted in malicious activity (e.g., fraudulent financial transactions).16 But that
analysis is too narrow. The question becomes, when a state private right—created
either by common or statutory law—is violated, how does applying federal Article
III standing law comply with core principles of the separation of powers and
federalism? In other words, is requiring an identity theft analysis in data breach
standing consistent with core principles when the claim arises under state law?
This Comment will argue that the Supreme Court should analyze standing in data
breach litigation under a standard that is deferential to state statutory and common
law. Specifically, federal standing analysis should look to state law when
determining whether an injury is concrete such that the injury-in-fact requirement is
met. Some argue that allowing more data breach cases to proceed to the merits could
lead to an explosion of successful litigation and settlements, burdening the federal
courts17 and causing economic losses for the breached businesses.18 These concerns
may be valid. But if state law provides a remedy to the harm suffered, the federal
courts should not remove their redress. Federalism instructs otherwise.19
Part I explains the current data breach climate. Part II then discusses the more
common causes of action that plaintiffs claim in data breach litigation. Part III then
begins the standing discussion and lays out the existing state of affairs for standing

stemming from a data breach has confounded the lower courts. There has been no consistent
or coherent judicial approach to data-breach harms.”).
15. Solove et al., supra note 7, at 741–42 (discussing identity-based harm reasoning used
by courts in data breach litigation); Bradford C. Mank, Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and
Article III Standing: Will the Supreme Court Resolve the Split in the Circuits?, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1323, 1325 (2017) (noting that typical plaintiffs allege “that the defendant’s
failure to protect [their] personal data [have caused them] damages by increasing [their] risk
of suffering actual identity theft”).
16. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771–72 (8th Cir. 2017) (concluding that “the
complaint has not sufficiently alleged a substantial risk of identity theft, and plaintiffs’
allegations of future injury do not support standing”).
17. See Note, Competitors’ Standing To Challenge Administrative Action Under the APA,
104 U. PENN. L. REV. 843, 845 (1956) (noting that, in the administrative law context, “[a]
liberal application of statutory standing might result in a flood of suits and appeals”); see also
Stephen Lanza, The Liberalization of Article III Standing: The Supreme Court’s IllConsidered Endorsement of Citizen Suits in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc., 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1447, 1454 (2000) (discussing congressional recognition
that the possibility that public action in the citizen suit context could overburden the courts).
18. Settlements in data breach litigation can be quite high, which results in severe
economic loss either for the business or their insurance provider—assuming they even have
cyber insurance. Marty Puranik, What Is the Cost of a Data Breach, FORBES (Dec. 2, 2019,
8:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/12/02/what-is-the-cost-of-adata-breach [https://perma.cc/6728-V3CH] (“The average total cost per breach has increased
from $3.54 million in 2006 to $8.19 million in 2019.”). On the extreme high end, Equifax
recently settled with private plaintiffs and the Federal Trade Commission. The settlement will
pay between $575 and $700 million. Equifax To Pay up to $700 Million in US Data Breach
Settlement, CNBC (July 22, 2019, 7:03 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/22/equifax-topay-up-to-650-million-in-data-breach-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/8LED-5CNE].
19. See infra Section IV.C.
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in data breach litigation. Next, Part IV discusses dignitary harms and the need to
respect the sovereignty of the individual states and their ability to define their own
laws. That Part argues the Supreme Court should defer to state determinations of
what constitutes harm under the law the state wrote. Then, Part V addresses the
inconsistent results that the tightening of standing law has created and discusses the
possibility of a federal omnibus privacy law. Finally, this Comment concludes by
reiterating the point that plaintiffs must allege that a legally protected right has been
violated. To effectively analyze this claim, the Supreme Court should defer to the
entity that created that legally protected interest and determine what it sought to
protect.
I. DATA BREACH CLIMATE
Data breaches have become routine.20 As a result, all fifty states have passed
legislation that requires breached companies to notify relevant consumers that their
data has been compromised.21 The FTC, under authority of section five of the FTC
Act, has started prosecuting companies that “deceptively” fail to live up to their own
privacy policies.22 Furthermore, under the same authority, the FTC has started to
prosecute corporate entities for “unfair” cybersecurity practices. These unfair
practices are those that are likely to cause substantial injury to consumers—injuries
that are both reasonably unavoidable by the consumer and are not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to those consumers or to competition.23 Still, no general
federal law or regulation exists to mandate minimum standards for how all
companies protect consumer data or to provide a private right of action for consumers
to hold companies accountable.24 U.S. policy has instead been to pass piecemeal,

20. Dynkin et al., supra note 1; see also Jon L. Mills & Kelsey Harclerode, Privacy, Mass
Intrusion, and the Modern Data Breach, 69 FLA. L. REV. 771, 771 (2017) (noting the daily
occurrence of data breaches).
21. Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy Localism, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1961, 1970 (stating that “all
fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have enacted
[data breach notification] laws”). Still, data breach notification laws do not sufficiently protect
privacy. See Solove et al., supra note 7, at 781 (“Data-breach-notification laws require
provision of notice to people about data breaches, but they do little to redress any injuries
caused.”).
22. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 241 (3rd Cir. 2015) (discussing
that the complaint charged a “deception claim” that alleged Wyndham’s privacy policy
overstated the company’s cybersecurity posture).
23. William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1148–49
(2019); Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 240 (noting the FTC allegation that
Wyndham engaged in “unfair” practices because their cybersecurity posture “unreasonably
and unnecessarily exposed consumers’ personal data to unauthorized access and theft”).
24. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014) (noting that “there is no federal law that directly
protects the privacy of data collected and used by merchants such as Macy’s and Amazon.com
. . . [or] the forms of data collection in use by companies such as Facebook and Google”);
Scott J. Shackelford, Andrew A. Proia, Brenton Martell & Amanda N. Craig, Toward a Global
Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity
Framework on Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50
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sector-specific privacy laws.25 Thus, aggrieved consumers often rely on state
statutory and common law, or one of the federal statutes that apply in limited
circumstances.26
This ability to seek legal redress under state law is increasingly important because
of how common data breaches have become. According to one source, there were
forty-five percent more data breaches in 2017 than in 2016.27 USA Today has
reported that between April and June of 2018, more than 765 million people were
affected by data breaches.28 In September 2018, Facebook was breached, exposing
the personal data of nearly fifty million users.29 And Fortune has noted that, even
though the total number of breaches declined from the previous year, “the number of
exposed records more than doubled” in 2018.30
The risk of consumer data being breached is only exacerbated by the nature and
scope of the data being collected by corporate entities. Data has become a commodity
and is used to create behavioral profiles of consumers.31 This information is

TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 309–10 (2015) (noting that “[c]urrently, no baseline, comprehensive
cybersecurity obligations are imposed across all of the U.S. critical infrastructure, but
regulations do exist for certain sectors . . . .”).
25. Federal privacy law is, currently, a patchwork of laws that each apply to different
“sectors.” If an entity operates in that sector, then those laws apply. Digit. & Cyberspace Pol’y
Program, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELS. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection
[https://perma.cc/JLJ9-RK6M] (“Most Western countries have already adopted
comprehensive legal protections for personal data, but the United States—home to some of
the most advanced, and largest, technology and data companies in the world—continues to
lumber forward with a patchwork of sector-specific laws and regulations that fail to adequately
protect data.”).
26. See infra Part II.
27. Steve Turner, 2018 Data Breaches—The Worst of Last Year, IDENTITY FORCE (Dec.
27, 2017), https://www.identityforce.com/blog/2018-data-breaches [https://perma.cc/8FAXT6GP].
28. Mike Snider, Your Data Was Probably Stolen in Cyberattack in 2018—and You
Should Care, USA TODAY (Dec. 28, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money
/2018/12/28/data-breaches-2018-billions-hit-growing-number-cyberattacks/2413411002
[https://perma.cc/A6V3-KUET].
29. Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes Accounts of 50
Million Users, THE NY TIMES (Sep. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/28/technol
ogy/facebook-hack-data-breach.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FPrivacy [https://
perma.cc/DAM3-DTR5].
30. Danielle Abril, Data Breaches Declined Last Year. But Here’s Why You Should Be
More Worried Than Ever, FORTUNE (Jan. 29, 2019, 5:53 PM), http://fortune.com/2019/01/29
/data-breaches-decline-2018-consumer-data-risk-rises [https://perma.cc/SC8W-5WHP].
31. Dustin D. Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3, 32 (2011) (“Indeed, behavioral advertising is already
being used to aggregate a commodity-consumer information-that, to the individual consumer,
has little exchange value into a valuable product that allows the consumer to access relevant
and free Internet content.”); see also Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s
Consumer Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 99 (2013) (explaining that
behavioral advertising is “based on information about the individual user” and “requires that
the entity serving up the ad have access to a trove of information about particular Internet
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extremely valuable to companies interested in targeted advertising, which has created
a vast market for information.32 Furthermore, companies collect this data for a
reason; it is highly instructive about the consumer’s personality and potential buying
habits.33 Thus, the unconsented-to exposure of this data to malicious actors, and to
the public, could be highly offensive to the privacy and dignity of the consumer,
regardless of the pecuniary harm involved.34 This is especially true if the company
involved engages in behavioral advertising, which incentivizes the accumulation of
more and more data35 and requires the “large-scale and long-term collection, storage,
analysis, and . . . sharing” of that data.36
Given the dearth of federal law requiring companies to reasonably protect
consumer data and given the resulting lack of statutory damages for failing to meet
such a requirement, the ability to seek legal redress on state law theories is critically
important. Furthermore, data breach litigation could increase the cost to businesses
for failing to follow reasonable cybersecurity measures.37 These settlements can be
quite expensive for the breached business, which likely encourages businesses to
invest in cybersecurity insurance.38 This only increases the likelihood that consumers
will be better protected. Cybersecurity insurance providers often end up acting like
pseudo regulatory bodies, because of those providers’ requirements for covering
companies with insurance.39

users”).
32. Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospect of an
Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 85 (2015) (“New monetization opportunities
are thus associated with a new global architecture of data capture and analysis that produces
rewards and punishments aimed at modifying and commoditizing behavior for profit.”). Still,
as Katherine Strandburg notes, “it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of online
advertising.” Strandburg, supra note 31, at 102. And some people may even argue that even
behavioral advertising, the more intrusive option, is not that effective. Avi Goldfarb and
Catherine Tucker looked at the effectiveness of behavioral advertising and concluded that its
effectiveness “declined by about 65 percent after the adoption” of the European Union’s 2002
Data Protection Directive. Strandburg, supra note 31, at 103 (citing Avi Goldfarb & Catherine
Tucker, Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising 18 (Aug. 5, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1600259 [https://perma.cc
/7CDL-TCPP]. Still, as Katherine Strandburg explains, “[t]he overall impact of the ads was
small both before and after enactment [of the Data Protection Directive], corresponding to
about a 2.5 percent increase in expressed willingness to purchase.” Strandburg, supra note 31,
at 103 (citing Goldfarb et al., supra note 32, at 19).
33. See Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things: Discrimination,
Privacy, and Cybersecurity in the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENV. L. REV. 87, 95–96
(2018).
34. Solove et al., supra note 7, at 764, 768 (noting how plaintiffs “clearly suffer emotional
distress” and interfere with a person’s ability to develop their “inviolate personality”).
35. Strandburg, supra note 31, at 125.
36. Id. at 100.
37. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
38. See id.; James A. Johnson, Insuring Against Cybercrime – Know the Risks, N.Y. ST.
B. ASS’N J., May 2019, at 14, 16 (explaining that quality cyber insurance policies should cover
the cost of “[s]ettlements, judgments, [and] civil awards after a data breach”).
39. Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance: How Insurance
Companies Act as “Compliance Managers” for Businesses, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 417, 429
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II. CAUSES OF ACTION
Data breach cases are argued under a myriad of theories, often under state law
causes of action.40 While some sectoral federal law does offer privacy protection,41
and some private rights of action, in very specific circumstances,42 data breach
plaintiffs often resort to state common law claims of negligence, unjust enrichment,
bailment,43 and breach of contract—both implied and express.44 Depending on the
state, plaintiffs may also seek redress under state statutory laws governing breach
notification, unfair competition, and consumer privacy.45 Under federal law,
plaintiffs can sue if the events giving rise to the litigation fall under one of the various
sectoral privacy laws. These include violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), the Stored Communications Act (SCA), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and
the Privacy Act.46 But as discussed, these laws apply in only specific—often in-

(2017) (explaining that cyber insurance providers will assess the cyber risk of the company
and could require certain cyber improvements before covering the company and further
explaining how being more cyber secure may lower the premiums the company must pay for
the insurance).
40. Timothy H. Madden, Data Breach Class Action Litigation – A Tough Road for
Plaintiffs, 55 BOSTON B.J. 27, 29 (2011) (“Plaintiffs have brought these claims under myriad
legal theories, including negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent
misrepresentation, violation of state consumer protection laws such as Mass. General Laws
ch. 93A, and others. Sometimes, class action plaintiffs also seek to invoke the protections of
the various state data breach notification laws.”).
41. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, PUB. L. NO.
104-191, 110 STAT. 1936; Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, PUB. L. NO. 105277, 112 STAT. 2681-728; Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, PUB. L. NO. 100-618, 102
STAT. 3195.
42. See Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 621–22 (7th Cir. 2014)
(discussing VPPA’s private right of action). But see O’Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Wyo., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179, 1182 (D. Wyo. 2001) (finding no private right of action,
either implied or express, exists in HIPAA).
43. While some people may argue that bailment as a cause of action in data breach
litigation is a stretch, Justice Gorsuch conceptualized data held by third parties in the Fourth
Amendment context as a bailment. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2268–70
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). While this is merely a dissenting opinion, it could serve as
the first sign of how future courts could view data held by third parties.
44. Madden, supra note 40.
45. See, e.g., Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 20–22, 28–31, Antman v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., No. 15-cv-0115-LB, 2015 WL 2151231 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2018) (No.
15-1175), ECF No. 179 (claiming negligence, breach of contract, California statutory law);
Consumer Plaintiffs’ First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 240–42, In
re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn. 2014) (MDL
No. 14-2522), ECF No. 258 (alleging numerous state data breach and consumer law statutes,
negligence, breach of implied contract, bailment, and unjust enrichment); see also Madden,
supra note 40.
46. See, e.g., Amended Complaint ¶ 9, In re U.S. Office Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach
Litig., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 15-1394), ECF No. 63 (claiming a violation of
the Privacy Act, among other things); Class Action Complaint at 12, 18, 22, Green v. eBay
Inc., No. 2:14-cv-01688, 2015 WL 2066531 (E.D. La. 2015) (No. 14-1688), ECF No. 1
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applicable—circumstances.47
Regardless of the cause of action, data breach plaintiffs have encountered
problems.48 The obvious problem—and one of the reasons traditional, intentional
invasion of privacy torts49 are not a clean fit—is that the individual directly
responsible for the harm is the malicious actor that breached the company and
accessed the personal data of the plaintiffs. The company can hardly be responsible
for intentionally invading the privacy of the consumers.50 Presumably, the company
did not hack itself or directly expose the consumers’ personal data to the public.
Rather, it merely failed to live up to reasonable standards for protecting the
consumers’ data. But we have a tort for that—negligence.51 The company may not
have intended to disclose the consumers’ data to the public or a malicious third party,
but, as the theory goes, the company does have a duty to safeguard the consumer data
it collects and failing to implement reasonable security measures is a breach of that
duty.52
Still, the merits of these negligence claims, or any other cause of action, cannot
be litigated until the court determines that the plaintiffs have standing to sue, such
that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.53 As the next Part
explains, data breach plaintiffs have struggled with this requirement in no small part
because of the “concrete” injury analysis.
III. STANDING
The U.S. Constitution calls for a tripartite system of government in which the

(claiming violations of the Stored Communications Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and more).
47. Essentially, if limited to federal law, plaintiffs would have to hope the breached
records implicate one of the more protected sectors (e.g., medical or financial records). See
supra note 41.
48. See Madden, supra note 40 (“All of these types of claims, however, have [fared]
poorly, in Massachusetts and elsewhere.”).
49. “The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different
interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, . . . these four torts may
be described as follows: 1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs. 2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 3.
Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 4. Appropriation, for the
defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
50. This is because the privacy torts are intentional torts. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J.
Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1908 (2010)
(describing Prosser’s privacy torts as intentional torts).
51. Travis N. Jenson, Note, Cooling the Hot Pursuit: Toward A Categorical Approach,
73 IND. L.J. 1277, 1287 & n.70 (1998) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164 (5th ed. 1984)) (describing negligence and its elements).
52. See, e.g., Consumer Plaintiffs’ First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint
¶¶ 108–13, In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D.
Minn. 2014) (MDL No. 14-2522), ECF No. 258 (detailing plaintiff’s claim of negligence).
53. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing that issues of justiciability are
jurisdictional in nature).

946

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:937

legislative, judicial, and executive functions are separated into distinct branches of
government.54 To ensure the judiciary does not invade the sphere of the other two
branches,55 federal courts are deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction when cases are
deemed nonjusticiable.56 In other words, cases must be the type that federal judges
are equipped to resolve.57 Along with the requirement that cases be ripe58 and not
moot,59 standing is a key element of justiciability.60
Most of Article III standing law has been created since 1944.61 But early Article
III standing analysis simply limited federal courts’ jurisdiction to cases and
controversies where “Congress or any other source of law had granted the plaintiff
the right to sue.”62 Still, little evidence exists to prove what precisely the Founders
meant by cases and controversies.63 And while modern standing law goes beyond

54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 3.
55. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (noting that “the law of Art. III standing is
built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 752 (1984))).
56. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (2018) (“To invoke federal
jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show a ‘personal stake’ in the outcome of the action. . . . A case
that becomes moot at any point during the proceedings is ‘no longer a “Case” or “Controversy”
for purposes of Article III,’ and is outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (describing questions of justiciability as being required to
warrant the “invocation of federal-court jurisdiction”).
57. Kristin E. Hickman, How Did We Get Here Anyway?: Considering the Standing
Question in DaimlerCrystler v. Cuno, 4 GEO. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 47, 48–49 (2006) (“Standing
doctrine plays an important role in a system of government that divides power among three
co-equal branches and dual sovereigns. Both Article III and prudential standing requirements
serve the federal judiciary by limiting its jurisdiction to actual disputes between parties that
judges are particularly equipped to resolve.”).
58. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 321 (1991) (“We also discern no ripe controversy in
the allegations that respondents desire to endorse candidates in future elections . . . .”); see
also 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532.1 (3d ed. 2008) (noting that ripeness is concerned with
“whether a dispute has yet matured to a point that warrants decision”).
59. Renne, 501 U.S. at 320 (noting that “[j]usticiability concerns not only the standing of
litigants to assert particular claims, but also the appropriate timing of judicial intervention”
and that the respondents failed to demonstrate a “live controversy,” meaning the disputes had
been rendered “moot by the time respondents filed suit”); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
58, § 3533.1 (noting that mootness is concerned with whether “any effective purpose can still
be served by a specific remedy”).
60. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 58, § 3529 (“The central concepts often are elaborated into
more specific categories—advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness,
mootness, political questions, and administrative questions.”).
61. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 169 (1992). But see Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,
487 (1923) (describing the harm as “remote, fluctuating and uncertain,” which speaks to much
of the same concerns as today’s interpretation of the Article III standing requirement). Still,
Sunstein’s analysis that much of modern standing law was developed in recent history remains
valid even if previous case law sounded in similar concerns.
62. Sunstein, supra note 61, at 170.
63. Id. at 173.
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intent of the legislature,64 Cass Sunstein has noted that “[t]here is no reason to think
that the Framers sought to limit Congress’ power to create ‘cases’ or ‘controversies’
by conferring causes of action.”65 The Framers’ intent was simply to limit federal
courts’ jurisdiction to “cases where individual plaintiffs brought their own grievances
for resolution and relief.”66 But still, the cases and controversies requirement has
morphed into an increasingly complex body of law.67
The policy behind the case and controversy limitations was built on the separation
of powers, to ensure one branch of government did not inappropriately invade the
sphere of another.68 This is why the Supreme Court has applied an especially rigorous
analysis in cases where plaintiffs ask the judiciary to second-guess a decision of the
executive or legislative branch.69 But, as Erwin Chemerensky has explained, refusing
to confer standing on plaintiffs can also impinge on the separation of powers.70 Thus,
the standing analysis “focuses attention directly on the question of what is the proper
place of the judiciary in the American system of government.”71
Modern interpretation of Article III standing has created a test to ensure the
objective of the separation of powers principle is respected.72 Now, under the Lujan
test, the Court must be able to find an injury in fact, trace that injury to the conduct
complained of, and the resolution of the case at bar must produce a likelihood that

64. See id. at 164–66 (discussing Scalia’s argument that Article III should impose limits
on “the power of Congress to convert generalized benefits into legal rights” and then later
discussing how Scalia’s opinion in Lujan forbids Congress from creating citizen standing).
65. Id. at 173.
66. “In sum, a fair reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention and the
contemporary legal environment makes it more likely than not that the Framers envisioned
that the federal courts would be limited, as a constitutional matter, to cases where individual
plaintiffs brought their own grievances for resolution and relief.”
James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the Injury-in-Fact Rule,
and the Framers’ Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 40,
47 (2001); see also Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017) (“Our
standing doctrine accomplishes this by requiring plaintiffs to ‘alleg[e] such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to . . . justify [the] exercise of the court’s remedial powers
on [their] behalf.’” (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976))).
67. Lanza, supra note 17, at 1452–53 (explaining that courts “rarely follow bright-line
rules” and that “the introduction of citizen suit provisions in environmental statutes . . . brought
the Supreme Court face to face with the glaring inadequacies of an increasingly complex body
of law”).
68. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (“The law of Article III
standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial
process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”). But see Leonard &
Brant, supra note 66, at 48 (“Yet a quick glance at the [Constitution] as a whole reveals that
the concept of divided government was never intended to compartmentalize strictly
governmental powers by type, nor to prohibit certain interactions between the branches of
government.”).
69. See infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
70. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §2.3.1, at 56 (7th ed. 2016).
71. Id.
72. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
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the injury will be redressed.73 Given that standing is a jurisdictional question,74 the
burden of proving each element lies with the party asserting federal jurisdiction.75 I
turn to these elements in reverse order to dispense quickly with the second two, as
they are not the focus of this Comment.
For any federal court to hear a case, the resolution of the action must provide
redress for the injury complained of. This is logically a forward-looking test. Will
finding for the plaintiff and awarding the requested relief redress the injury? Instead
of requiring an absolute certainty, the Court requires a likelihood that the injury will
be redressed, something beyond mere speculation.76 For example, in Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., the Court recognized that
civil penalties not paid to the plaintiffs could provide a deterrent effect to the
defendant’s ongoing unlawful activity.77 Thus, the plaintiffs met the redressability
element of the standing requirement.78 As stated, however, the likelihood of redress
must not be merely speculative.79
Whether the injury in data breach litigation can be redressed depends on what the
injury is. Is it the anxiety that occurred because of the data breach itself, or is it the
pecuniary harm from identity theft or fraud—or from trying to prevent identity theft
or fraud? To analyze this prong of the Lujan test, federal courts need to determine
what the harm is and then determine whether the relief requested will likely remedy
that harm. Stated differently, courts cannot redress the harm until the injury-in-fact
analysis is complete. Then, they must delve into the complex analysis of whether the
requested remedy redresses that harm and how much remediation is required to
satisfy constitutional standing requirements. Still, whether resolution of a data breach
case can be properly redressed without merely speculating is outside the narrow
scope of this Comment.

73. Id.; see also Kimberly N. Brown, What’s Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and the
Battle For Judicial Review, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 677, 677 (2007) (referring to the Lujan test as
“the reigning test”).
74. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing that issues of justiciability are
jurisdictional in nature).
75. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 411–12 (2013) (“‘The party invoking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing’ standing—and, at the summary judgment
stage, such a party ‘can no longer rest on . . . “mere allegations,” but must “set forth” by
affidavit or other evidence “specific facts.”’” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561)); see also Lujan,
504 U.S. at 561 (noting further that the requirements of proof depend on the litigation stage,
factual allegation at the pleading stage or setting forth specific facts through evidence or
affidavits at the summary judgment stage).
76. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
77. 528 U.S. 167, 185–86 (2000).
78. Id. But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 529 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (“When a litigant is
vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the
requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly
harmed the litigant.” (emphasis added)).
79. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 136 (2011); see also
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 129 & n.20 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that the redressability requirement “reflects the view that the adjudication of rights
which a court is powerless to enforce is tantamount to an advisory opinion”).
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Next, the injury must be fairly traceable to the conduct complained of. This means
there must be a causal nexus between the conduct complained of and the injury such
that the line of causation between the two is not attenuated.80 But this causal nexus
requirement is a lower burden than traditional proximate cause.81 Again, this should
be discussed in more detail once harm has been found. This is because whether the
harm is traceable largely depends on where the Court finds harm—whether the harm
is in the anxiety resulting from the breach itself or merely in the subsequent malicious
use of the data. Some may argue that traceability is difficult given the problems in
knowing whether a particular malicious actor obtained the consumer’s data from the
complained of breach or from another source—especially given how many entities
collect consumer data.82 Still, if the plaintiff’s anxiety is a result of their knowledge
of the defendant’s breach and not of subsequent misuse, then that harm, if
recognized, may be more easily traceable to the defendant’s failure to maintain a
reasonable standard of care.83 Again though, whether the injury complained of can
be fairly traced to the conduct of the defendant is a topic to be explored later, in
subsequent scholarship, and in further detail.
Finally, modern Article III standing law requires the existence of an injury-infact, even though this term did not appear in Supreme Court case law until 1970 in
Barlow v. Collins.84 Now, a plaintiff must show a violation of a legally protected
interest that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, as opposed to merely
conjectural or hypothetical.85 To be sure, all of these elements are required. While
the concrete and particularized elements may have been conflated in the past, the
Supreme Court held in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins that while the “particularized” element
is necessary, it is not sufficient.86 For a harm to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement,
it must also be concrete.87 In other words, it must be real—not abstract.88 Though, as

80. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that
the alleged misconduct must not be a result of the actions of third parties not before the court,
and that the causal connection must not be attenuated, even though there can be links in the
chain).
81. Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91–92 (2nd Cir. 2013).
82. In other words, one could argue that even if a plaintiff proves that their data is for sale
on the dark web, as one example, that fact alone does not necessarily mean the data came from
the defendant’s network at all. This is because that same data could be held by a plethora of
other businesses that may or may not have been hacked as well. To support this theory, one
need only look to the fact that data has become a commodity. Countless companies collect
information on their customers. Adam B. Thimmesch, Transacting in Data: Tax, Privacy, and
the New Economy, 94 DENVER L. REV. 145, 149 (2016) (discussing the ubiquitous nature of
data collection practices). And those companies may not even know if they have been hacked.
See, e.g., Lance Bonner, Note, Cyber Risk: How the 2011 Sony Data Breach and the Need for
Cyber Risk Insurance Policies Should Direct the Federal Response to Rising Data Breaches,
40 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 257, 263 (2012) (“At least one of these data breaches went
undiscovered for almost two years, and some most likely have never been discovered.”).
83. Solove et al., supra note 7.
84. 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Sunstein, supra note 61.
85. 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
86. 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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will be discussed later, Spokeo expressly states that intangible injuries can be
concrete.89
Whether a harm is concrete is especially important in privacy cases, where
injuries may be dignitary, as opposed to the pecuniary harms common in propertybased grievances.90 Still, data breach litigation typically resorts to claims of identity
theft or fraud, or an increased risk thereof. As the next sections explain, circuits have
not been entirely consistent on how to conduct injury in fact analysis.91 But assuming
the plaintiff has alleged facts necessary to show that the injury is particularized to
them,92 the inquiry must continue to the concreteness analysis.93
Before transitioning to Part V and the discussion of dignitary harms and the need
to respect state sovereignty, this Part lays out the current state of affairs in data breach
litigation. Section III.A delves deeper into the injury-in-fact analysis and the need to
avoid speculative claims of harm. Then, Section III.B discusses the so-called circuit
split over the question of whether an increased risk of harm is sufficient for Article
III standing.
A. Injury in Fact After Clapper
In data breach litigation, the injury-in-fact inquiry has proved a difficult obstacle
for plaintiffs.94 Some see the injury to plaintiffs as trivial.95 Others see the litigation
as favoring plaintiffs’ attorneys rather than remedying any real harm.96 This is often

89. Id. at 1549.
90. Solove et al., supra note 7, at 745 (“Knowing that thieves may be using one’s personal
data for criminal ends can produce significant anxiety.”).
91. See infra Sections III.A–D.
92. Injuries are particularized when they have a “personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (further implying that particularization
helps ensure that the plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is necessary
to sharpen the presentation of issues—that is, to properly advance the best arguments for the
legal questions).
93. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
94. Bugni, supra note 12, at 72 (“In sum, plaintiffs face many obstacles in data breach
class actions that relate to the injury element of standing.”).
95. Of course, whether an injury is de minimus changes depending on what information
is stolen. For example, in Alonso v. Blue Sky Resorts, LLC, 179 F. Supp. 3d 857, 862 (S.D.
Ind. 2016), the plaintiff alleged that the breach resulted in the theft of their names, credit card
numbers, and expiration dates. The court noted that credit cards were replaced, credit
monitoring services provided, and the plaintiffs did not allege actual lost wages or reduced
credit limits. Id. at 864. Thus, the court determined that the injury was not concrete,
particularized, or certainly impending. Id.
96. See Abraham B. Dyk, A Better Way to Cy Pres: A Proposal to Reform Class Action
Cy Pres Distribution, 21 NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 635, 650 (2018) (noting the generous
awards going to attorneys’ fees “with little money going to actual class members”). Thinking
logically, individual plaintiffs receive relatively low percentages in these class actions. On the
other hand, the attorneys collectively receive very generous payouts. Thus, plaintiffs’
attorneys seem to have the high incentive to bring data breach class action lawsuits against
breached companies.
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because the recovery by each individual plaintiff in the class can be quite low.97
Nonetheless, settlements are often very high because of the number of plaintiffs
involved.98 Thus, resolving the standing issue in these cases remains critically
important. Ultimately, this Comment argues that the Supreme Court should defer to
state substantive law when determining whether an alleged injury is concrete. But
first, an understanding of the current approach is warranted.
Typically, plaintiffs argue that the disclosure of the breached information either
led to, or increased the risk of, identity theft or fraud.99 Of course, if someone’s
identity has been stolen, that is a very real injury. But what if all the information
needed to steal a plaintiff’s identity is now in the hands of a malicious actor because
of a data breach? Does the capability to steal a plaintiff’s identity—or evidence that
others have seen malicious use of their data—make a future possible injury imminent
or does it remain hypothetical?
In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the plaintiffs were engaged in work that
required them to communicate with individuals that the plaintiffs believed were
under surveillance by the U.S. intelligence community.100 Thus, the Clapper
plaintiffs argued that they suffered an injury in fact because an objectively reasonable
likelihood existed that their communications with those individuals would be
captured by the intelligence community.101 In a narrow 5-4 majority, the Court
disagreed.102 The Court held that the Clapper plaintiffs’ “theory of future injury

97. See, e.g., Kate O’Flaherty, Equifax Can’t Afford Promised Customer Payout, FTC
Confirms, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2019/08/01
/ftc-confirms-equifax-cant-afford-promised-customer-payout [https://perma.cc/E4UT-98CG]
(noting that the minimum $125 payout may not even be available to all customers); Jessica
Karmasek, Federal Judge Grants Final Approval in Consumer Class Action over Target Data
Breach, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Dec. 3, 2015), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/510651158federal-judge-grants-final-approval-in-consumer-class-action-over-target-data-breach
[https://perma.cc/FE9K-CYN3] (noting an average payout of $300).
98. See, e.g., Brigette Honaker, Equifax Data Breach Class Action Settlement, TOP CLASS
ACTIONS (July 26, 2019), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/privacy/databreach/909741-equifax-data-breach-class-action-settlement [https://perma.cc/GE6L-D7BZ]
(estimating 147 million people affected for a $380.5 restitution fund with another $125 in
potential funding); Kelly Tyko, Yahoo Data Breach Settlement 2019: How to Get Up to $358
or Free Credit Monitoring, USA TODAY (Oct. 14, 2019, 3:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/money/2019/10/14/yahoo-data-breach-117-5-million-settlement-get-cash-monitoring
/3976582002 [https://perma.cc/KB8E-XWB3] (noting the $117.5 million class action
settlement, which was only $358 per person but also noting that the amount could be $100 or
less and that it depended the number of claimants relative to the size of the fund pool).
99. Brandon Ferrick, No Harm, No Foul: The Fourth Circuit Struggles with the “Injuryin-Fact” Requirement to Article III Standing in Data Breach Class Actions, 59 B.C. L. REV.
ELEC. SUPPLEMENT 462, 463 (2018) (noting that “an increased risk of future identity theft is
the most commonly alleged injury in lawsuits following data breaches” and also noting that
two other arguments center around actual identity theft and actual financial harm).
100. 568 U.S. 398, 406 (2013) (“Respondents are attorneys and human rights, labor, legal,
and media organizations whose work allegedly requires them to engage in sensitive and
sometimes privileged telephone and e-mail communications with colleagues, clients, sources,
and other individuals . . . .”).
101. Id. at 407.
102. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, OYEZ.COM, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012
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[was] too speculative to satisfy the well-established requirement that threatened
injury must be ‘certainly impending.’”103 The Court further noted that deciding
otherwise would amount to “abandon[ing] our usual reluctance to endorse standing
theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors.”104 In so
holding, the Clapper Court expressly rejected the Second Circuit’s “objectively
reasonable likelihood” standard for determining when an injury is certainly
impending.105
But the Clapper plaintiffs were asking the Court to confer standing where
reaching the merits of the dispute would have forced the federal courts to determine
the constitutionality of an action taken by another branch of government106—an
action that would offend the original underlying purpose of standing, the separation
of powers.107 Even though reviewing the constitutionality of government action is a
critical role of the Court,108 Justice Alito—writing for the majority in Clapper—
applied a heightened standard for these cases.109 He noted, “[o]ur standing inquiry
has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us
to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal
Government was unconstitutional.”110 Furthermore, Justice Alito noted that the
federal courts have “often found a lack of standing” where they have been asked to
“review actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence gathering and
foreign affairs.”111 Given that the Clapper Court stressed the importance of applying
a heightened burden in cases that question the other branches of government—
especially in cases that implicate the intelligence and foreign affairs communities—
one may expect post-Clapper courts to apply a lesser standard to data breach claims
that do not implicate these concerns. But that has not been the case.112
Furthermore, the Clapper plaintiffs were not completely off track. The Clapper
decision was announced just four months before the revelations surrounding Edward

/11-1025 [https://perma.cc/2FS6-DMS3].
103. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401. The Court further noted that the Clapper plaintiffs’
argument rested on the “highly speculative fear” that the government was, or would be,
targeting the people with whom the plaintiffs communicate, that they would be doing so under
the authority of the law the plaintiffs sought declared unconstitutional, that the FISA judges
would determine that the government satisfied the strictures of that law, that the government’s
surveillance attempts would be successful, and that the plaintiffs’ communications would then
actually be among those intercepted. Id. at 410.
104. Id. at 414.
105. Id. at 410. The Second Circuit’s analysis would have established standing where
plaintiffs could establish that they suffered burdens not based on “fanciful, paranoid, or
otherwise unreasonable” grounds. Id. at 416 (quoting Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d
163, 180 (2d Cir. 2011) (Reena Raggi, J., dissenting)).
106. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408.
107. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
108. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (establishing judicial review
and noting that “the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature,
repugnant to the constitution, is void”).
109. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408.
110. Id. (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)).
111. Id. at 409.
112. See infra Section III.B.
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Snowden and the NSA’s widespread surveillance program.113 The Clapper plaintiffs
lost because they were supposedly speculating about whether their communications
had been collected.114 But “[t]hey had no actual knowledge of these government
surveillance programs because the programs were kept secret by the plaintiffs’
adversary—the government.”115 Before Snowden, the lay citizen may have
reasonably deemed fears of government spying as the fanciful fears of conspiracy
theorists and anti-government activists. After Snowden, widespread government
surveillance may be considered the norm—and hardly speculative. Still, reasonable
minds can differ on how much speculation and inference is appropriate. In fact,
reasonable minds did differ.116 Regardless, courts should not lose sight of the fact
that the context in which the Supreme Court decided Clapper was considerably
different than private, consumer litigation.
Clapper has proven very influential in data breach litigation, even though data
breach litigation does not present the same separation of powers concerns as were
present in Clapper.117 In applying Clapper, courts have seemingly come to opposite

113. Margo E. Kaminski, Standing After Snowden, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 421 (2017)
(“Then in June 2013, a mere four months after Amnesty, the Snowden stories began.”). In
2013, Snowden revealed that the government was conducting widespread surveillance that
seems to make the Clapper plaintiffs’ claims seem much less like speculation. Glenn
Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phonerecords-verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/8A6Y-N7SK] (reporting the mass surveillance
at the heart of the Edward Snowden controversy); Glenn Greenwood, Ewen MacAskill &
Laura Poitras, Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance
Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013, 09:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/6X7UESQX] (identifying Edward Snowden as the whistleblower). For a helpful background on
Edward Snowden, see generally Hanna Kim, Note, The Resilient Foundation of Democracy:
The Legal Deconstruction of the Washington Post’s Condemnation of Edward Snowden, 93
IND. L.J. 533, 535–37 (2018).
114. Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Williams, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Clapper Court determined that plaintiffs were merely speculating but
noting the strength of the plaintiff’s claims, including the fact that the government had “already
intercepted 10,000 phone calls and 20,000 emails involving one individual who [was] in
regular communication with one of the plaintiffs”).
115. Kaminski, supra note 113, at 421–22.
116. Compare Klayman, 800 F.3d at 564 (Brown, J., concurring) (distinguishing Clapper
post-Snowden and noting that while “the Clapper plaintiffs relied on speculation and
conjecture to press their claim, here, plaintiffs offer an inference derived from known facts”),
with id. at 567 (Williams, J., concurring) (“But, assuming [plaintiffs’] evidence to be in some
sense more specific, the relevant inquiry is whether that evidence indicates that the program
targets plaintiffs. As to that, the plaintiffs here do no better than those in Clapper.”), and id. at
569 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (noting that “plaintiffs never in any fashion demonstrate that the
government is or has been collecting such records from their telecommunications provider,
nor that it will do so”).
117. See, e.g., Paul G. Karlsgodt & Dustin M. Dow, The Practical Approach: How the
Roberts Court Has Enhanced Class Action Procedure by Strategically Carving at the Edges,
48 AKRON L. REV. 883, 891 (2015) (“The Clapper decision has been applied by many lower
courts, particularly in the data breach context, in rejecting class actions due to the lack of any
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conclusions.118 When malicious actors steal data and expose it to the public, the
victim’s privacy has been intruded.119 But if plaintiffs argue standing based on an
increased risk of identity theft, then they arguably are speculating that independent
actors not before the court will act in a certain way. That is precisely the sort of
speculation Clapper sought to avoid—just in a different context. In the end—and as
the next Section explains—circuit courts have seemingly applied two different
approaches. One approach is stricter, and one more liberally recognizes the increased
risk of harm as sufficient to confer standing.
B. Increased Risk of Identity Theft
For several years, scholars and judges have argued that circuits are split as to
whether plaintiffs can establish standing based on an increased risk of identity
theft.120 However, the split arguably does not exist at all. Instead, the cases can be
synthesized by analyzing the factual differences.121 In other words, the circuits are
not necessarily applying different legal analyses, they are simply dealing with
differing sets of facts. Judge Scriven in the Middle District of Florida has gleaned
three factors from an analysis of the various circuits’ standing decisions.122 These are

injury-in-fact sufficient to support Article III standing.”).
118. See Kimberly Fasking, Comment, Beck v. McDonald: The Waiting Game—Is an
Increased Risk of Future Identity Theft an Injury-in-Fact for Article III Standing?, 41 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 387, 389 (2017) (“Currently, a circuit split exists on the issue of whether the
victim of a data breach has Article III standing to sue the entity with whom she entrusted her
personally identifying information when that information has not yet been used to commit
fraud.”).
119. Benjamin C. West, No Harm, Still Foul: When an Injury-in-Fact Materializes in a
Consumer Data Breach, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 701, 716 (2018) (“Even without the loss of time
and money, there is a more basic harm—the invasion of privacy itself. On its own, a breach
constitutes a sufficient harm for standing purposes because of the presumed psychological
harms associated with it.”).
120. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Our sister circuits are divided
on whether a plaintiff may establish an Article III injury in fact based on an increased risk of
future identity theft.”); Allison Holt, Joby Ryan & Joseph W. Ryan, Jr., Standing in the Midst
of a Data Breach Class Action, 84 DEF. COUNS. J. 1, 9 (2017) (explaining that “[w]hat
practitioners are left with is a true Circuit Split”); Hanley Chew & Tyler G. Newby, Eight
Circuit Holds Data Breach Plaintiffs Must Allege Actual Injury to Establish Standing, 22 NO.
9 CYBERSPACE LAW. NL 6 (2017) (“The Circuit Split is likely to continue until—and unless—
the Supreme Court weighs in and offers more definitive guidance.”); Michael Hopkins,
Comment, Your Personal Information Was Stolen? That’s an Injury: Article III Standing in
the Context of Data Breaches, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 427, 440 (2019) (noting that “the growing
incidence of data breach litigation has since led to a sizeable circuit split”).
121. In re 21st Century Oncology Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 380 F. Supp. 3d 1243,
1251 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (“Notably, however, although the circuits have diverged in result, the
bases behind the differing decisions have several commonalities. That is to say, the differing
sets of facts involved in each circuit’s decision are what appear to have driven the ultimate
decision on standing, not necessarily a fundamental disagreement on the law.”).
122. Id. at 1251–54; see also In re Brinker Data Incident Litig., No. 3:18-cv-686-J32MCR, 2019 WL 3502993, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2019) (endorsing Judge Scriven’s
analysis).
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(1) the motives of the potentially malicious actor,123 (2) the type of information
involved in the data breach,124 and (3) whether evidence exists showing that a third
party has in fact accessed or fraudulently used the information at issue.125
All of this shows how plaintiffs, under the right circumstances, can argue that they
have standing in federal court based on an increased risk of identity theft. Given this
well-documented path to standing, plaintiffs’ lawyers may be most compelled to
argue standing on a theory of identity theft. But that should not be the only path. The
Supreme Court in Spokeo clearly stated that intangible harms can be sufficient to
confer Article III standing.126 Thus, plaintiffs’ lawyers should at least argue in the
alternative that their clients have standing based on the dignitary harms they suffered
as a result of the data breach. If they do, Judge Scriven’s three-prong imminence
test127 can still be instructive because meeting those factors would logically deepen
a plaintiff’s negative emotional state. Still, plaintiffs’ attorneys may decide that
arguing standing under a theory of dignitary harm may imperil their chances at class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2),128 but that discussion
will be saved for a subsequent article. Instead of delving into the question of class
certification, this Comment assumes for now that class certification will not prohibit
dignitary harms from being redressed in federal court.
IV. DIGNITARY HARM AND RESPECT FOR STATE SOVEREIGNTY
As discussed above, the current standing arguments in data breach litigation
center around the idea that the harm is the identity theft or fraud that results from the
privacies of life being made available online. But while identity theft or fraud is
certainly a harm, it can take a significant amount of time to develop.129 The more
immediate harm from data breaches is often the dignitary harm that results not from
the subsequent misuse of the data but from the mere fact that the data has been
disclosed to the public.130 And while arguments may center around pecuniary harm,

123. 21st Century Oncology, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 1252 (“Thus, the Court finds that one
factor considered by the diverging circuits in determining whether Plaintiffs have alleged an
injury based on an increased risk of identity theft is the alleged motive of the unauthorized
third-party that obtained access to Plaintiffs’ personal information.”).
124. Id. at 1253–54 (“What can be gleaned from the circuits’ decisions in this respect is
that the type of information compromised can play a role in the Court’s injury in fact analysis,
and, where that information includes personally identifiable information, this factor will weigh
in favor of a finding of injury in fact.”).
125. Id. at 1254 (“Third, the circuits have found that an increased risk of identity theft is
more likely to constitute an injury in fact where there is evidence that a third-party has accessed
the sensitive information and/or already used the compromised data fraudulently.”).
126. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
127. 21st Century Oncology, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 1252–54.
128. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Rule 23(a)(2) requires that class members have
“questions of law or fact” in common. Some may argue that this could preclude certification
for dignitary harms that may require more investigation into individual class members than
identity-based harms. While I disagree, this will be the focus of follow-up scholarship.
129. West, supra note 119, at 712–13 (discussing the delay that can occur between the
breach and the resulting harm and noting that this creates problems with statutes of limitation).
130. Id. at 716 (“Even without the loss of time and money, there is a more basic harm—
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intangible harms—like anxiety and emotional distress—do not per se fail the injuryin-fact analysis. The Supreme Court has expressly determined that intangible injuries
can be concrete.131
In recognizing that an intangible injury can be concrete, Justice Alito—writing
for the majority in Spokeo—noted that courts should consider historical practice and
the judgment of Congress.132 With causes of action arising under common law, the
historical factor then becomes more important.133 For the historical factor, Spokeo
instructs courts to determine whether the intangible harm bears a “close relationship
to harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in
English or American courts.”134
The dignitary harm inflicted by failing to protect consumer data privacy seems to
bear a close relationship to the commonly recognized right to privacy. Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote their famous article, The Right to Privacy, in
1890.135 In it, they proclaimed that “[t]he common law secures to each individual the
right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others.”136 They wrote their article in response
to a growing concern of the media intruding on the privacies of life.137 The result was
simple: Warren and Brandeis subscribed to Judge Cooley’s belief138 that each person
has a “general right to be let alone.”139 Even in 1890, Warren and Brandeis saw
mental suffering as a recognized “basis for compensation.”140

the invasion of privacy itself. On its own, a breach constitutes a sufficient harm for standing
purposes because of the presumed psychological harms associated with it.”).
131. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (referring to two free speech cases as examples of
intangible harm, even though those cases did not implicate standing doctrine).
132. Long v. Se. Penn. Trans. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 321 (3rd Cir. 2018) (“In determining
whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both history and the judgment of
Congress play important roles.” (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549)).
133. Of course, this is because if a law is judge made, the legislature played no role. Then
again, one may argue that legislative inaction is itself a judgment call.
134. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
135. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
136. Id. at 198.
137. Id. at 195 (“Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step
which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what
Judge Cooley calls the right ‘to be let alone.’ Instantaneous photographs and newspaper
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet
shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’” (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS
29 (2d ed. 1888))).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 205 (“These considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection afforded
to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or the arts,
so far as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the
more general right of the individual to be let alone.”).
140. Id. at 213 (“If the invasion of privacy constitutes a legal injuria, the elements for
demanding redress exist, since already the value of mental suffering, caused by an act
wrongful in itself, is recognized as a basis for compensation.”).
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Following Warren and Brandeis’s article, some courts recognized the right to
privacy, and others were slower to accept it.141 But regardless, the recognition of
dignitary harms—those against the dignity and reputation of the victim—have long
been recognized at common law.142 In 1960, William Prosser published his
influential article, Privacy, in which he built on Warren and Brandeis’s work by
articulating four invasion-of-privacy torts.143 These torts were the intrusion upon
seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, and appropriation.144 Like the
anxiety and general emotional distress in data breach litigation, the harms these torts
recognize represent harms to the dignity and inviolate personality of the victim.145
But these harms have not only been recognized by academics; the courts have long
accepted them as well.146
Arguably, the harm resulting from a data breach bears an even closer relationship
to the breach of confidentiality tort.147 In Burger v. Blair Medical Associates, Inc.,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that the “confidential nature” of the
relationship between patient and physician, and the “personal nature of the
information” collected, gave rise to a breach of confidential tort claim if that sensitive
information was improperly disclosed.148 Similarly, when companies collect and

141. Prosser, supra note 49, at 385 (discussing cases in New York and Massachusetts that
allowed recovery on an independent right to privacy theory and then discussing Atkinson v.
John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899), in Michigan, which “flatly rejected the
whole idea”).
142. Jay P. Kesan, Carol M. Hayes & Masooda N. Bashir, Information Privacy and Data
Control in Cloud Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341, 380–81 (2013) (“This view of privacy harms focuses on dignitary
harms, like harm to reputation, based on the concept that privacy violations are a type of
invasion to the victim’s dignity.”).
143. Prosser, supra note 49.
144. Id.
145. Solove et al., supra note 7 (discussing emotional distress as a “crucial aspect” of the
harm suffered by the consumer victims of data breaches); Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth
of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 23 (2008) (“If dignity recognizes the right of each
individual to his or her own, unique ‘inviolate personality,’ privacy allows that personhood to
develop.”).
146. Even in 1960, Prosser noted that “the right to privacy, in one form or another, is
declared to exist by the overwhelming majority of the American courts.” Prosser, supra note
49, at 386. Apart from privacy torts, the American Law Institute also created a project, in
which Daniel Solove and Paul Schwartz were the reporters, to “provide a set of best practices
for entities that collect and control data concerning individuals.” Daniel Solove, ALI Principles
of Law, Data Privacy, TEACHPRIVACY (May 23, 2019), https://teachprivacy.com/aliprinciples-of-law-data-privacy [https://perma.cc/KA4L-QBTQ]; Daniel J. Solove & Paul M.
Schwartz, ALI Data Privacy: Overview and Black Letter Text (Jan. 24, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3457563 [https://perma.cc
/3XWC-EXVP].
147. While the tort most commonly applies to physicians, it can be found to apply more
broadly by looking at the nature of the relationship between the parties, by considering
fiduciary duties, or by finding a breach of an implied contract of confidentiality. Neil M.
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality,
96 GEO. L.J. 123, 157–58 (2007).
148. See 964 A.2d 374, 376, 381 (Pa. 2009) (noting the existence of a physician-patient
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retain data on consumers because of the established business-consumer relationship,
a privilege should be created whereby those businesses must exercise due diligence
to protect that data—the confidences—the consumers trusted them with. Then, when
malicious actors break into those companies’ networks—and exfiltrate sensitive
consumer data because of the companies’ failure to adequately safeguard the data—
those companies have breached the consumers’ confidence.149
Thus, dignitary harms have long been recognized, and they seem to satisfy the
Spokeo requirements for intangible but concrete injuries. Given the language in
Spokeo and given the history of recognizing dignitary harms, the idea that federal
courts would recognize dignitary harms in data breach litigation should not be
radical. But there is another reason to recognize dignitary harms—that the same
underlying rationale in Erie Doctrine applies here and, therefore, the Supreme Court
should instruct lower federal courts to defer to state interpretations of what
constitutes harm under the laws that the state created. Some may ask why plaintiffs
cannot simply bring their claims in state court to begin with, but that argument misses
the point. Plaintiffs have a statutory right to bring cases in federal court that do not
necessarily have a federal interest, so long as those cases satisfy the requirements for
diversity jurisdiction.150 Just as federal courts defer to state substantive law in these
diversity cases, the rationale of Erie can be furthered by looking to the underlying
state law to determine whether the “concrete” requirement of the injury-in-fact
analysis has been satisfied. The rest of this Part delves into that argument by
discussing Erie Doctrine and its underlying rationale; how the concrete analysis of
standing doctrine implicates the substantive law at issue; and why those rationales
and the substantive nature of the concreteness analysis militate toward deference to
state interpretations of their own law.
A. Erie Doctrine
In 1938, the Supreme Court decided Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.151 There, the
plaintiff was walking next to train tracks and was injured by an object protruding
from a passing train.152 The company—Erie Railroad Company—argued that
Pennsylvania law should apply.153 However, Tompkins argued for the application of
Swift v. Tyson, such that the absence of state statutory law would have allowed the

breach of confidentiality tort when the physician discloses the privileged confidences of the
patient).
149. The analogy here is even stronger because unlike some other torts, the breach of
confidentiality does not require a showing that the conduct of the defendant was “highly
offensive.” Solove et al., supra note 7, at 746 (“The tort of breach of confidentiality recognizes
emotional distress as a cognizable injury without the need to show highly offensive conduct.”).
150. F. Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies, and Diversity, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 100
(2014).
151. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
152. Id. at 69 (noting the allegation that the plaintiff “was struck by something which
looked like a door projecting from one of the moving cars”).
153. Id. at 70.
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federal courts to apply their own general common law.154 The Court rejected the
notion that there is such a thing as a general federal common law.155
Instead, the Court determined that for issues of substantive law, federal courts
must defer to the state law applicable in each case, whether statutory or common.156
Of course, the Court did not mean that there is no federal common law at all. On the
same day the Court announced Erie, it also explained, in Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., that some non-general federal common law still
exists.157 Still, that case directly involved two states.158 And as Jay Tidmarsh has
argued, in cases where a state’s self interest in the outcome is “less acute, and
participation by interested parties is possible[,] . . . no resort to a separate body of
federal common law is necessary.”159 While both Tidmarsh’s article and the Erie
decision discussed the rules of decision governing a case, their rationales remain
valid in the standing context.
Multiple rationales underpinned the Erie decision, and they should be considered
here. While the Erie decision has been debated,160 the widely recognized underlying
rationales were to prevent forum shopping, to promote uniformity of the
administration of the laws of the individual states,161 and to respect federalism.162 If
the federal courts continue to maintain that these rationales are sacred, then the
application of these rationales to concreteness analysis could be compelling.

154. Id. at 70–71. In Swift v. Tyson, Justice Story endorsed the idea of a federal common
law for “questions of a more general nature.” Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting
Erie On the Right Track, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937, 943 (1998) (quoting Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
1, 18–19 (1842)).
155. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“There is no federal general common law.”).
156. See id. at 78–79.
157. 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (“For whether the water of an interstate stream must be
apportioned between the two States is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon which neither
the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.”).
158. Id.
159. Jay Tidmarsh, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 588
(2006).
160. E.g., Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105, 1111 (E.D. Ky. 1980)
(explaining the debate as to whether Erie “is a statutory or constitutional decision”).
161. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential Democracy-Enhancing Benefits
of Erie Formalism, 44 AKRON L. REV. 907, 923 (noting “Erie’s policy goals of avoiding, where
possible, disparate outcomes in state and federal court as well as the discouragement of undue
federal-state forum shopping”).
162. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 517 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“Thus, Erie was deeply rooted in notions of federalism, and is most seriously implicated
when, as here, federal judges displace the state law that would ordinarily govern with their
own rules of federal common law.”); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“Erie was something more than an opinion which worried about ‘forum-shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws,’ although to be sure these were
important elements of the decision. I have always regarded that decision as one of the modern
cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of
judicial power between the state and federal systems.” (citation omitted)); In re County of
Orange, 784 F.3d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 2015) (referring to “Erie’s federalism principle”).
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First, Erie sought to avoid forum shopping—the practice of seeking out the court
mostly likely to provide a favorable outcome.163 In the standing context, recognizing
harms inconsistent with state interpretations could lead to outcome-determinative
forum shopping by plaintiffs’ lawyers. Second, Justice Brandeis—writing for the
Court in Erie—was particularly concerned that Swift had “prevented uniformity in
the administration of the law of the state.”164 In other words, the doctrine in Swift v.
Tyson meant that diversity jurisdiction cases in federal court applied different
substantive law—and potentially resulted in different outcomes—than if those same
cases were litigated in state court.165 In the standing context, a failure to implement
state interpretations of harm will lead to federal courts vindicating rights less often
under the same underlying law because they may have different opinions about
which harms create a case or controversy. And third, Justice Brandeis noted in the
concluding paragraphs of the Erie majority opinion that “[s]upervision over either
the legislative or the judicial action of the states is in no case permissible except as
to matters by the constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United
States.”166 In other words, federal courts should respect our constitutional system of
federalism—do not intrude on a state’s power to make its own laws. Again, in the
standing context, applying state substantive law—as Erie mandates—but without
deferring to state interpretations of what constitutes harm under those same laws
seems to violate federalism and the spirit of Erie.
These same rationales should be considered in data breach litigation when
determining whether plaintiffs have standing. Specifically, and as stated above, the
Supreme Court should defer to state substantive law when determining whether the
complained-of injury is concrete for the purposes of the injury-in-fact analysis. This
is because, as the next section discusses, the “concrete” nature of the injury is
necessarily wrapped up in the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. Of course, federal
courts will always apply the irreducible minimum three-prong test, but that should
not remove their ability to look to state authority when ensuring the existence of a
concrete injury.
B. Standing as Procedural, Concreteness as Substantive
Even though some cases have seemed to differentiate subject-matter jurisdiction
and questions of standing,167 more recent Supreme Court case law has made it clear
that issues of justiciability represent a limitation on federal subject-matter

163. Gelfand et al., supra note 154, at 972 (discussing the forum-shopping incentive test
and noting the possibility that a “reasonable lawyer who is about to file the lawsuit would be
substantially motivated by the difference between the state and federal rules to select either
the federal or state court over the other”).
164. Erie, 304 U.S. at 75.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 79 (further noting that “[a]ny interference with either . . . is an invasion of the
authority of the state, and, to that extent, a denial of its independence”).
167. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512 (1969) (“[T]here is a significant
difference between determining whether a federal court has ‘jurisdiction of the subject matter’
and determining whether a cause over which a court has subject matter jurisdiction is
‘justiciable.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962))).
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jurisdiction.168 If a plaintiff presents a nonjusticiable case, federal courts have no
jurisdiction.169 Of course, one element of justiciability is that plaintiffs must have
standing to bring suit.170 These types of questions may not always be thought of as
substantive, and therefore, Erie has not been applied.171 Instead of deferring to the
desires of state judges and lawmakers, federal courts have simply noted their
requirement to apply the irreducible minimum three-prong test. Critically, and as
previously stated, this Comment recognizes that federal courts must comply with the
strictures of Article III precedent.
But while the injury-in-fact prong must be satisfied, the Supreme Court should
recognize that analyzing the injury necessarily should involve an analysis of the law
that created the legally protected interest that has been allegedly violated. In other
words, for the concreteness analysis of the injury-in-fact prong, the Justices should
defer to state interpretations of what counts as a concrete injury under the laws that
the state created. Courts ask whether the plaintiff complains of a violation of a legally
protected interest. When answering this question, the appropriate analysis would be
to ask what legal interest the creator of the law sought to protect. If the interest the
state sought to protect has been violated, the Supreme Court should hold that
plaintiffs have suffered a concrete injury. The Supreme Court should not care that a
state, and not the federal government, created the legal interest. If a state cause of
action seeks to protect dignitary harms in the data breach context—or any other
context—then those harms should be sufficient to confer standing such that
plaintiffs’ rights can be vindicated in federal court. Anything less defeats the purpose
of diversity jurisdiction and disrespects the state’s objective and its sovereign right
to define its own legal protections.
C. Federalism, Dual Sovereignty, and Extending Erie
Central to our constitutional republic, and part of the underlying rationale in Erie,
is the idea that the federal government and the various state governments are separate
political sovereigns. One should not intrude upon the other’s sphere of power.172

168. See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (2018) (“A case that
becomes moot at any point during the proceedings is ‘no longer a “Case” or “Controversy”
for purposes of Article III,’ and is outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” (quoting
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013))). Of course, this was in the context of
mootness. Id.
169. CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“The Constitution of the United States limits the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts
to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” (emphasis added)); see also Norvell v. Sangre de Cristo Dev.
Co., 519 F.2d 370, 378 (10th Cir. 1975) (“District courts are without jurisdiction when
confronted with non-justiciable political questions.”).
170. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98 (1968) (noting that “[s]tanding is an aspect of
justiciability”); see also La. Env’t Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1385 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (referring to standing as an element of justiciability).
171. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (“Under the Erie
doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural
law.”).
172. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819) (“In America, the powers
of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union, and those of the States. They
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Federalism was developed by the Framers as a “response to the real and perceived
shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation.”173 Still, the debate over the bounds
of federalism existed even at the Founding. For example, Alexander Hamilton
proposed that state governors should be appointed by the President.174 Today’s
debate over the value of federalism would probably not go that far. Even the modern
legal scholars that do not prioritize federalism would likely be uncomfortable with
Hamilton’s proposed level of federal involvement in state politics.175
To be sure, the centrality and importance of federalism is still a debated topic. But
even though the Court has permitted the expansion of the federal government,176
federalism remains a core constitutional principle and a powerful “protection against
federal tyranny.”177 The core of the federalism argument is simple: “Impermissible
interference with state sovereignty is not within the enumerated powers of the
National Government, and action that exceeds the National Government’s
enumerated powers undermines the sovereign interests of States.”178
The Supreme Court should consider federalism when analyzing whether plaintiffs
have suffered a concrete injury after a data breach. As discussed above, many of the
causes of action arise under state law.179 As Professor Hessick notes, “Whether a
plaintiff has standing depends on whether the [substantive] law gives [them]
standing.”180 This means that determining whether the complained-of injury is
concrete “cannot be divorced from the merits” of the case.181 This view of standing,
as intertwined with the merits, means that in diversity cases the Supreme Court
should apply the state’s interpretation of state law claims—just as state courts do.182

are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with
respect to the objects committed to the other.”).
173. Richard E. Levy & Stephen R. McAllister, Defining the Roles of the National and
State Governments in the American Federal System: A Symposium, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 971,
974 (1997).
174. Id. at 974–75.
175. For interesting background information on some of the different conceptualizations
of federalism and some criticism of the traditional idea of dual federalism, see Robert A.
Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005).
176. Namely, in the expansion of the Commerce Clause in cases like Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
177. Levy, supra note 173, at 975, 979 (referring to Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No.
32 and later discussing that federalism can be interpreted to promote political accountability
and protect individual liberties).
178. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 225 (2011) (citing New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 155–59 (1992)) (citation omitted).
179. See supra Part II.
180. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing in Diversity, 65 ALA. L. REV. 417, 418 (2013).
181. Id.
182. Id. Applying state standing law in diversity cases also comports with the purpose
underlying diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 424. The point is that federal court can act as an
alternative forum for litigants that live in different states. Id. This will almost always be the
case in data breach litigation because of the nature of our economy. Companies large enough
to be sued via class action lawsuit for a data breach are likely doing business across state lines.
Applying federal standing law to data breach litigation is merely a signal to data breach
plaintiffs that diversity jurisdiction is simply not available to them in the same way, that their
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Of course, requiring the federal judiciary to limit itself to cases and controversies is
important. But that does not negate the point that, in determining whether a legally
protected interest has or has not been violated, the Supreme Court should defer to
state interpretations of what constitutes harm under their own laws. In the data breach
context, this means that instead of relegating the standing analysis to identity-based
harm analysis in all cases, courts should recognize the harm that the state causes of
action seek to protect.
We have seen that standing analysis can be more rigorous when national security
and the intelligence community are at issue, like in Clapper.183 And we saw in that
same case that there is a heightened interest in deferring to another branch of
government.184 But just as the separation of powers may lead to a heightened reason
to find a lack of standing, federalism—respect for the state’s right to determine when
harm exists under its own common and statutory law—should create a less searching
standard whereby the Supreme Court instructs federal courts to defer to the state’s
understanding of harm. Let the state determine whether the state believes the alleged
injury is sufficiently pronounced.185
Courts have sometimes seemed to confer standing on the grounds of emotional,
dignitary harms.186 And the Spokeo test for intangible injuries seems to expressly
allow for that.187 But the Spokeo test should not be the only way in which a court
could recognize emotional and dignitary harms in data breach litigation. The

harm must be greater in federal court versus state court.
183. See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Section III.A.
185. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court to date has not followed this reasoning. See
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 715 (2013) (“And no matter its reasons, the fact that a
State thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance
cannot override our settled law to the contrary.”). But even in Hollingsworth, the Court was
analyzing particularization. Id. (noting the requirement that plaintiffs seek relief for a
“personal, particularized injury”). Maybe the Court will be inclined to view federalism
differently under the “concrete” injury analysis, especially given Justice Thomas’s view that
parties seeking relief under a private right of action should have an easier route to standing.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550, 1552 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).
186. E.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding an
injury in fact when “the only present injury” was that the plaintiff had “generalized anxiety
and stress”—though whether the anxiety was enough is arguably unclear given that the
Krottner court also found that the theft of the laptop created an increased risk of harm); see
also Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 641 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Doe has standing to
sue, the Court agrees, based on ‘allegations that he was “torn . . . all to pieces” and “greatly
concerned and worried” because of the disclosure of his Social Security number and its
potentially “devastating” consequences.’”). Of course, Doe was in the Privacy Act context
where Congress had expressly created a legally protected interest. Id. Furthermore, these
examples pre-date Spokeo. They represent instances where emotional, dignitary harms have
been sufficient, but they do not apply the reasoning in Spokeo for recognizing intangible
injuries. Also, the cited language in Chao was merely dicta. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262,
273 (4th Cir. 2017).
187. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to
recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that intangible injuries can
nevertheless be concrete.”).
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Supreme Court should consider the underlying rationale of Erie doctrine and extend
that rationale to the concrete injury analysis.188 While standing is a jurisdiction
question,189 determining whether a harm is concrete necessarily becomes intertwined
with substantive law.190 Thus, based on the same underlying rationale in Erie,191 the
Supreme Court should defer to state sovereignty—it should look to state substantive
law in determining whether the state common or statutory law recognizes the harm
complained of. If state common or statutory law recognizes dignitary harms in data
breach litigation, then plaintiffs alleging those harms have alleged a concrete injury
to a protected legal right—the federal inquiry should go no further. Likewise, if a
state determines that recognizing anxiety harms in data breach litigation is not the
law of that state, then the federal judiciary should not second guess that state’s
decision and standing should not exist. This could lead to inconsistent results among
the states, but of course it is each state’s right to have a law inconsistent from the
rest. If the United States Congress determines that this inconsistency is undesirable,
then preemption of that inconsistency is within their power.
V. INCONSISTENT RESULTS, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
Failing to defer to state law could lead to different results in federal and state
courts.192 Data breach plaintiffs reside in jurisdictions across the country, and these
lawsuits are often class actions that rely on diversity jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act.193 Thus, they have a right to litigate in federal court. But without

188. See supra Section IV.A.
189. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing that issues of justiciability are
jurisdictional in nature); supra Section IV.B.
190. Hessick, supra note 180, at 421 (“Although framed as a threshold jurisdictional
question, standing cannot be so easily separated from the merits of the case.”).
191. Pizarro-de-Ramirez v. Grecomar Shipping Agency, 82 F.R.D. 327, 330 (D.P.R. 1976)
(“In Hanna, the policies underlying the Erie decision were defined as discouragement of
forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”). But see Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Erie was something more than an
opinion which worried about ‘forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of
the laws,’ although to be sure these were important elements of the decision. I have always
regarded that decision as one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies
that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial power between the state and federal systems.”
(internal citation omitted)).
192. Heather Elliott, Federalism Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 435, 436 (2013) (discussing
Judge Fletcher’s scholarship and arguing that standing analysis can have the troubling result
“that state courts can announce unreviewable decisions on federal law” and further discussing
Andrew Hessick’s point that state law claims should be analyzed under state standing law so
that litigants are “truly free to choose between state and federal court” without risking
dismissal of the case). Notably, while this paper only argues that federal courts should defer
to state law when analyzing whether a harm is concrete, Professor Hessick has argued more
broadly that “[f]ederal justiciability doctrines should not apply to state law suits brought in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction.” Hessick, supra note 150, at 106.
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2018); see also Sean-Patrick Wilson & Roland M. Jaurez,
Class Action Fairness Act: Determining the “Amount in Controversy” in California, HUNTON
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exercising deference to the states, federal judges are removing this right to sue in
federal court and relegating data breach plaintiffs to the state judicial process. This
point merely serves the purpose of noting that symmetry between federal and state
courts would lead to more consistent results. Just as in Erie,194 federal courts should
be concerned that these inconsistent results could lead to forum shopping.195
As discussed above, the “concrete harm” analysis always seems to come back to
identity theft, or at least a heightened risk of being a victim of identity theft or
fraud.196 But why? The courts have long recognized dignitary harms in other
contexts. Prosser’s invasion of privacy torts are just that.197 While some causes of
action—like a violation of the right to publicity—seek to recover from economic or
property harm,198 other causes of action—like appropriation—seek to redress
dignitary harms.199 For example, one particularly analogous tort, the breach of
confidentiality, recognizes “harms of broken trust, betrayal, and disrupted
expectations of secrecy.”200 But just because one harm is dignitary and the other is
pecuniary should not mean that the federal courts will refuse to even hear the case.
Given that the courts have not refused to recognize all dignitary harm,201
relegating data breach claims to a risk of identity theft analysis seems inconsistent.
Why would the courts recognize dignitary harm in one context, but not recognize the

EMP. & LAB. PERSPS. (July 2, 2018), https://www.huntonlaborblog.com/2018/07/articles
/california-developments/class-action-fairness-act-determining-amount-controversycalifornia [https://perma.cc/USV8-M6W8] (discussing further that defendants can remove
these class actions to federal court if originally filed in state court); Perry Cooper, T-Mobile
Keeps Data Breach Class Action Federal, BLOOMBERG LAW (April 3, 2019, 4:19 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/t-mobile-keeps-data-breach-class-action-federal
[https://perma.cc/62DJ-WQZ2].
194. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (“The decision was also in part a reaction
to the practice of ‘forum-shopping’ which had grown up in response to the rule of Swift v.
Tyson.”).
195. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 456 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[F]orum shopping will undoubtedly result if a plaintiff need only
file in federal instead of state court to seek a massive monetary award explicitly barred by state
law.”).
196. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
197. Prosser, supra note 49.
198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. L. INST. 1995) (explaining
that damages for violations of the right to publicity address the commercial interest in one’s
name or likeness).
199. Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts, 104
CORNELL L. REV. 317, 340 (2019) (explaining that while appropriation has often evolved into
a commercial appropriation claim—the right to publicity—appropriation began as a tort
focused on the protection of dignitary harms that occur based on a “presumed or anticipated
diminution of respect for the plaintiff that results from being perceived to have voluntarily
associated with the defendant’s commercial activity”).
200. Solove, supra note 7, at 770–71 (quoting Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 136, 147–48 (1992)).
201. Id. (“In case after case involving the privacy torts and breach-of-confidentiality tort,
courts have recognized harm based on pure emotional distress or psychological impairment.
Fear, anxiety, embarrassment, and loss of trust are all recognized as harms. Humiliation,
nervousness, worry, and loss of sleep are understood as compensable harms.”).
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dignitary harm that results from the breach of a consumer’s data, regardless of
whether the data is ever misused? Requiring a misuse of the data misses the point.
The simple breach of a duty to safeguard personal and confidential data—to properly
secure the data a company has collected on consumers—can itself result in a
dignitary harm analogous to the breach of confidentiality tort.202 Whether the data
will ever be misused is not dispositive; the point is that the consumer must now worry
that their data is no longer safe—the trust they had in the security of their personal
information is broken, and their data is potentially available to the public or even to
malicious actors.
One possible explanation for this inconsistency of harm recognition is simply the
potential for a significant influx in data breach litigation if the injury-in-fact
requirement was lessened. This is certainly a colorable argument, but the
counterargument is that data breach litigation vindicates the rights of consumers.
Additionally, by vindicating the rights of consumers, plaintiff class action lawsuits
against offending companies acts as a deterrent against other companies giving short
shrift to their data security budgets. Furthermore, it provides additional incentive for
companies to invest in cyber insurance203—and those insurance plans would likely
require companies to implement minimum security standards.204
Still, limiting these class action lawsuits may be the policy goal of lawmakers, but
it is just that—a policy goal.205 As Justice Thomas noted in his Spokeo concurrence,
“These [standing] limitations preserve separation of powers by preventing the
judiciary’s entanglement in disputes that are primarily political in nature.”206 In other
words, part of the point of standing is to make sure judges decide cases, and elected
representatives decide policy.207 But when courts use standing analysis as a way of
deciding policy questions, they are violating the fundamental purpose of standing
itself—the separation of powers. Furthermore, data breach litigation does not
inherently impinge on any separation of powers concern. Unlike the Clapper
plaintiffs,208 data breach plaintiffs are not asking federal courts to review any action
of another branch of government. Thus, the only separation of powers concern in
data breach litigation is the need to avoid undue policymaking.

202. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
205. Still, courts have a history of letting these sort of policy goals influence their
decisions. See Prosser, supra note 49, at 385 (discussing Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (1902), in which the court declined to find a right to privacy in part because
of the potential for an explosion of litigation).
206. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1551 (2016) (emphasis added).
207. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (“That threshold requirement ‘ensures
that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected
representatives.’” (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 700 (2013)) (emphasis in
original)); Hickman, supra note 57, at 49 (“Standing doctrine also prevents the judiciary from
intruding too deeply into matters of policy better left to the states or the political branches of
the federal government.”).
208. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).
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Congress has considered an omnibus privacy law and could consider a national
data breach law.209 These laws could, if Congress deems it necessary, preempt state
law in the data breach context.210 Furthermore, that law could remove plaintiffs’
private right of action, which would be even more true if the federal law expressly
preempts state common law causes of action. But preempting state law is the proper
domain of Congress. Such policymaking has no proper home in the judiciary.
Some may question whether deference to state law in these instances is even
constitutionally permissible. But justiciability requirements are largely judicially
created common-law rules made in an effort to promote the values at the core of our
Constitution. The text of Article III does not itself require the rigidity that has
developed in modern standing law.211 Just as the Supreme Court has developed these
laws to promote our core constitutional values, the Court is soundly within its power
to modify the concreteness analysis to further promote these same values.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether the state determines that intangible harms should be
recognized, the Supreme Court should follow the rationale in Erie and defer to state
determinations of what constitutes harm under their own common and statutory law.
While the federal courts must continue to apply the Lujan three-prong test, they
should also recognize that the determination of whether a harm is concrete is
naturally wrapped up in the substantive law. Thus, the underlying rationale of Erie,
and the core principle of federalism, should apply. The individual states have a
sovereign right to define the legal protections they afford their citizens. If a state sets
out to protect dignitary harms in data breach litigation—or any other context—
federal standing law should be no bar to suit when the court hears a case on diversity
jurisdiction.

209. STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, WILSON C. FREEMAN, & CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R45631, DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW 39, n.373 (2019) (“These
developments have all combined to put the issue of consumer data privacy squarely on
Congress’ doorstep. The question is no longer whether we need a federal law to protect
consumers’ privacy. The question is what shape that law should take.” (quoting Examining
Safeguards for Consumer Data Privacy Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, &
Transp., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Sen. John Thune)) (emphasis added)).
210. Id. at 62 (“Further, given that the states are likely to continue to experiment with
legislation, the CCPA being a prime example, it is likely that preemption will be a highly
significant issue in the debate over future federal privacy legislation.”).
211. Hessick, supra note 150, at 104.

